The practical implementation of the new economic policy led to a change in the relations of the Soviet state with the Church and, in 1923, brought about the transition to a new course of religious policy, which combined administrative pressure and repressions against the clergy with a “liberal” attitude towards ordinary believers. This article analyzes the implementation of the “religious NEP” in the south of the country, in particular, in the Kuban–Black Sea region and the Stavropol province, characterizes the contradictions between declaratory official documents and the activities of local authorities, identifies the main forms and methods of carrying out policy towards the Orthodox clergy and laity. Attention is drawn to the role of security authorities in the policy towards the Orthodox Church, including its regional specificity. The problem of “religious NEP” in the regions in question has not been a subject of special historical studies. The new religious course was perceived differently depending on the locality, the authorities did not take into account the need for tactical maneuvers with groups of believers. Thus, in the Kuban region in 1922–1923, administrative support for the Renovationist schism through the closure of churches and the liquidation of the “Tikhon communities” led to the dominance of the Renovationists among the church groups in the region, in defiance of the center’s instructions. This created the prerequisites for the intervention of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee in order to forcibly maintain a balance. At the same time, in the Stavropol province, the intense activity done by the episcopate of the Patriarchal Church and the sluggishness of the local authorities in 1923–1926 significantly reduced the support of Renovationism by the laity and necessitated the repressive actions of the security authorities. Simultaneously with the departure from the tactics of “religious NEP” in 1926, the anti-religious policy intensified, and public trials of the clergy were widely covered in the local press. Thus, the implementation of the policy during the period of the “religious NEP” in the localities was inconsistent and, despite the attempts of the center to achieve uniformity in its making, the party organs and the OGPU did not achieve the goal of destroying the Orthodox Church