The paper analyzes the anti-crisis economic policy of the Russian government at the end of the Soviet Union and reveals its role in combating growing crisis in the economy. The decisive condition for the implementation of this policy in August–September 1991 was the dismantling of the Soviet Union governance institutions after the defeat of the State Emergency Committee (GKChP). In historiography, the activities of the Government of the RSFSR in this period have been insufficiently studied: the employment of previously unused sources, primarily office papers, allows to significantly expand our knowledge of its work and to offer more balanced assessment of the measures introduced by the I.S. Silaev’s government and its policies in general. In the anti-crisis policy of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR in August–September 1991, two principal trends can be distinguished: reducing food deficiency and developing market reforms. To avert hunger, the Russian government organized barter exchanges with the Soviet Union republics, established channels for directing resources from the defense industry sectors, involved the personnel and equipment of the Soviet army for harvesting, and sought ways to ensure imports of necessary goods. The main content of preparations for market reform was a structural transformation of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR, launch of the process of transferring all-union property to republican jurisdiction and assessing its value, and the development of the government’s program of market reforms. The crucial problems and contradictions that influenced these preparations for the economic reform have been established on the basis of the study of structural transformations of the Council of Ministers and its administrative measures. The implementation of the anti-crisis policy of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR is considered in the context of the dynamics of inter-republic relations as one of the essential factors in the escalation of crisis. The results of the research have allowed reconsidering the role of I.S. Silaev’s government in the development of the Soviet Union and Russia after the events of August 1991.