The article examines the principles of operation and the structure of the Soviet administrative system of missile production on the eve of the Cuban missile crisis, which made it possible to develop advanced missile technology. Tis system had been constantly reforming. Technological progress led to the expansion of interindustry ties and involvement of industrial plants of various branches and regions, many scientists and technical experts in the area of missile production. Te reform of governing bodies of industry and construction was based on the principles of democratic centralism, which was supposed to activate the human resources of the country. Te ministries that were based on the pyramidal principle of administration were abolished, and the management of industry was entrusted to the regional economic councils (1957). However, new developments in the feld of rocketry remained under the control of the central departments. Te most important missile science and design organizations were subordinated to the State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for defense technology. In terms of cooperation, enterprises of the radio-electronic, shipbuilding, machinebuilding and other industries participated in the development projects. In 1958, the missile mass production was entrusted to the economic councils. Decentralization of the Soviet administrative system of missile production made it possible to expand production ties and to increase involvement of the human resources in the missile industry. Yet it was necessary to organize a complex supply and sales system and to establish constant control over the operations of hundreds of enterprises. An authoritative coordinating governing body was needed, and the Commission of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on military-industrial issues, which was established in December 1957, played an important role in steady coordination of the decentralized industry. Te reforms helped mobilize limited resources and, by 1962, develop advanced missiles to protect the USSR interests in international conficts (R-7 intercontinental missile, R-11 shortrange missile, R-12 and R-14 mediumrange missiles, S-75 and Dal antiaircraf missile systems, Storm and Buran intercontinental cruise missiles, antimissile defense systems etc.). Finally, the USSR became a superpower capable of defending its foreign policy interests.

This article analyzes how scientific research and experimental design work was organized in the Soviet Union to create rocket engines powered by nuclear energy. At the center of the study are state methods of governing advanced R&D that made it possible to develop and test a production technology for nuclear rocket engines. The article highlights the advantages of intersectoral cooperation in the development of cutting-edge rocket technologies based on nuclear reactions, and it surveys the principal directions and results of theoretical and applied investigations carried out in more than one hundred organizations across multiple ministries and agencies. The Soviet government succeeded in coordinating key institutions of the defense-industrial complex — above all the Ministry of Medium Machine Building and the State Committees responsible for aviation and defense technology — while also mobilizing enterprises and design bureaus from other departments and from the Councils of National Economy. Leading Soviet universities and organizations of the Academy of Sciences likewise played an active role, contributing to advances in thermodynamics and plasma physics. The article further considers the personal contribution of the principal designers of nuclear rocket engines in addressing organizational and theoretical problems at the initial stage of the program. Such engines were complex to produce and to operate. Standard liquid-propellant rocket engines were cheaper, far easier to master in mass production, and simpler to maintain in military units. Nuclear engines also posed environmental risks if used in the atmosphere and could expose servicing personnel to radiation. These factors meant that, in the Soviet Union, nuclear-powered rocket-engine technology for ballistic and cruise missiles was relegated to a reserve line of development. At the same time, research undertaken during the Khrushchev Thaw yielded beneficial consequences for space propulsion, since it contributed to the creation of more efficient electric, plasma, and ion engines for spacecraft.