The article examines the background, course and results of the visit of Eric Johnston, President of the US Chamber of Commerce, to the USSR in the summer of 1944 at the invitation of Joseph Stalin. The programme of his visit included meetings with the USSR Commissar of Foreign Trade, Anastas Mikoyan, visits to large industrial enterprises, meetings with their directors, party functionaries and cultural and artistic figures. It culminated in a lengthy meeting between Johnston and Stalin, during which a wide range of political, economic and commercial issues were discussed. The Soviet government saw Johnston as an iconic figure with infl uence not only in business but also in government circles. The Kremlin was interested in obtaining large US loans for the purchase of industrial equipment. Johnston was just the man to lobby both private American firms and the US government to grant these loans to the Soviet Union. Upon his return home he made every effort to secure a favorable resolution to the loan issue. Publications that painted a positive image of the Soviet Union and called for increased trade relations between the two countries were placed in key US business periodicals. Johnston’s position was shared by many businessmen and offi cials of relevant government agencies. However, proponents of a more pragmatic approach in both business and administrative circles pointed out that the United States could not increase imports from the Soviet Union to the level that would match the necessary exports and serve as collateral for a large loan. After Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Vyacheslav Molotov, officially requested for the loan on 3 January 1945, the US government used the loan as an instrument of political pressure on the Kremlin.

The article is an extensive review of the recently published monograph by Tomsk scholar O.G. Lekarenko, U.S. European Policy during the L. Johnson’s Presidency (1963–1969) (Tomsk: Tomsk State University Press, 2023). Th e author of the review generally follows the structure of the monograph, commenting consistently on the preparation, conduct and conclusion of the so-called Kennedy Round (1964–1967) within the framework of the negotiations on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. In terms of its political and economic consequences, the Kennedy Round was one of the key events in the world’s progressive movement towards the liberalization of international trade. Other events that had a significant impact on the course of the negotiations are also con si dered, such as the crisis in NATO, the elaboration of the principles of the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Economic Community, the policy of French President de Gaulle regarding the widening and deepening of the integration processes in Europe and interaction with the USA. O.G. Lekarenko demonstrates the interdependence of economic and political issues, as well as the role and place of regional issues (for example, the development of the Common Agricultural Policy of the EEC countries) in global processes, such as the development of political dominance of the USA in the Western Hemisphere, the liberalization of international trade, and the regulation of nuclear forces. In the end, the author of the monograph ultimately arrives at a conclusion with which it is quite possible to agree: despite the initial attempts to implement J. Kennedy’s “Great Project” of creating an Atlantic partnership between the USA and Europe, during his presidency Johnson reformulated the goal of the U.S. European policy and adopted a course of solving smaller but more urgent problems by isolating de Gaulle from his European allies. Johnson’s approach of waiting and observing the situation proved to be eff ective, as evidenced by the outcome of the GATT negotiations, which generally favoured the United States. Additionally, the establishment of a nuclear planning group within NATO was a notable development. However, it is important to note that Johnson was unable to resolve another issue, namely that the UK did not accede to the EEC during his presidency.