In February 1934, the Polish Foreign Minister J. Beck made his first and only visit to Moscow. The visit took place in the context of the German-Polish declaration of non-aggression, with the intention of allaying Soviet concerns and fostering a friendly atmosphere. However, the visit did not result in any substantial advancements in Polish-Soviet relations. The negotiations conducted by Beck with the head of the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs (NKID), M.M. Litvinov, yielded only modest outcomes. These were the elevation of diplomatic missions to the rank of embassies and an extension of the term of the Polish-Soviet non-aggression pact of 1932 for a period of 10 years. Consequently, despite an outwardly favourable outcome, the Polish foreign minister did not present specifi c proposals, and the visit did not resolve key issues. Beck’s approach was not aligned with Soviet initiatives for a joint declaration aimed at safeguarding the Baltic states, a clear indicator of Warsaw’s true intentions. Poland’s foreign policy was oriented towards fostering relations with Germany, while the Soviet leadership, having reached this conclusion, deemed the prospect of rapprochement with Poland to be unfeasible. Therefore, the Soviet Union initiated a systematic reduction in its political dialogue with Warsaw, confining it to the domain of cultural interactions. When evaluated from the perspective of Warsaw’s declared “policy of equilibrium”, it is evident that this policy can only be discussed in relation to the brief, three-week period between the German-Polish declaration of 26 January 1934 and Beck’s departure from Moscow in the evening of 15 February of the same year. The visit of J. Beck was indicative of the fact that the improvement of relations with the USSR was merely a transient tactical manoeuvre. Consequently, in the latter half of the 1930s, relations between Poland and the USSR began to deteriorate, despite the offi cially declared “warming” in relations.