Abstract

For the first time in Russian historiography the article uses documents from Lord Beaverbrook’s fund under the title “Moscow Narrative” from the parliamentary archives of Great Britain to demonstrate the activities of Lord Beaverbrook, the head of the British mission at the Moscow supply conference (1941). Lord Beaverbrook was Prime Minister, Winston Churchill’s confidant and was given extensive authority by the British government to propose, negotiate and sign a protocol on the British aid to the USSR. In domestic and even foreign historiography, this topic is relatively little studied, although in the framework of the formation of the anti-Hitler coalition the significance of the Moscow supply conference is extremely considerable. During the conference, the allies made all possible efforts to meet the requirements of the USSR. Of fundamental importance was the statement of Lord Beaverbrook that Britain was ready to forego the portion of American aid equivalent to the one required by Russia. Lord Beaverbrook’s notes show his impressions of Stalin and the changes in the atmosphere of the meetings of the allies, which is not recorded in the offi cial protocol of the Soviet side. According to Beaverbrook, when the British and Americans presented to Stalin a list of possible supplies, they adopted the tactic of a “cumulative effect”, that is, they often made concessions, agreeing to supply certain goods, then included the lists of goods that could not be “conceded” and eventually provided a long list of materials they agreed to supply. As a result, they accomplished their task. The negotiations resulted in satisfaction on the Soviet side, and in an atmosphere, which Lord Beaverbrook called “sun after rain”. During the meetings, a confidential personal contact was established between the allies. Head of the American delegation W.A. Harriman praised Lord Beaverbrook’s work. As a result of the negotiations, the Moscow Protocol was signed, which launched the Lend-Lease Program for the USSR. In the first year of the war, Great Britain handed over to the USSR almost everything that the Americans supplied to it under Lend-Lease, and did its best to fulfi ll its obligations on deliveries to the USSR.