Abstract

The article attempts to assess one of the remarkable episodes in the history of international relations in the interwar period, the rapprochement between Italy and France in the first months of 1935, which found its most striking embodiment in the Laval-Mussolini agreement of January 7, 1935. One of the cornerstones of Mussolini’s foreign policy was a concept of a “new Roman Empire”. Ethiopia and the Eastern Mediterranean were openly named the initial targets of expansion in official documents. By this period, Italy had more than restored its military and economic might, which was yet insufficient to achieve these ends. Italy chose France as its ally for undermining the status quo in Europe. During the first half of 1935, the countries came a long way in diplomatic rapprochement that reached the climax in the aforementioned Mussolini-Laval treaty and negotiations between the military headquarters of the two countries (winter-spring 1935). Italy proposed to resolve the bilateral colonial contradictions, in particular, the question of Italian citizens in Tunisia and local problems in East and North-East Africa. Despite the improvement in relations, France was not inclined to conclude a more binding agreement with Italy, following the early 20th-century example of the Entente. The relations between two countries were also influenced by the gradually aggravated German question. Nevertheless, the January agreements were taken by Mussolini as carte blanche in the Ethiopian area and later led to the outbreak of the Italo-Ethiopian war. However, due to the evasive position of France which did not much regard Italy as an ally against Germany, Mussolini curtailed attempts rapprochement with the Third Republic. The final event was the conference in Stresa, upon which Italy finally left the camp of the countries that guaranteed the Versailles-Washington system of international relations.