Abstract

The article covers the visit of Harold Wilson, the Labour Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, to the USSR in February 1975. Te purpose of the visit was to stabilize bilateral relations between the countries afer a long period of deterioration. Te summit of the heads of state was of great importance both in the context of the process of the relaxation of international tension and in the framework of Anglo-Soviet relations. Tis is evidenced by the diplomatic documents and reports in the press analysed by the author. Te article traces the stances of the heads of state on the issues of détente, the settlement of conficts in the Middle East and Cyprus, the development of bilateral trade relations. While Leonid Brezhnev was interested in the early holding of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Harold Wilson sought not to miss the opportunity to expand trade and economic cooperation. Tus, both sides were interested in the success of the negotiations. As a result of the summit, six documents were signed, in which the countries agreed to take efective measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, organize political consultations between Great Britain and the USSR, implement cooperation programs in the feld of economy, industry, science and technology, medicine and healthcare. What the British press considered a signifcant achievement was the agreement to provide the Soviet Union with a loan of 950 million pounds sterling for a period of fve years, which was supposed to increase the volume of trade turnover. Another important step towards each other, according to journalists, was the organization of round tables for members of the public. Tere was, however, a reasonable scepticism about the outcome of the meeting in both the Conservative and Labour press coverage. Soviet articles noted the involvement of Great Britain in the struggle for peace led by the USSR. Harold Wilson’s visit, on the one hand, provided new opportunities for the development of Anglo-Soviet relations, and, on the other hand, demonstrated the diference in the approaches of political leaders to understanding the détente.

References

Brown M. A Very British Vision of Détente: The United Kingdom’s Foreign Policy during the Helsinki Process, 1969–1975 // Overcoming the Iron Curtain: Visions of the End of the Cold War in Europe, 1945–1990 / Ed. by F. Bozo, M. Rey, B. Rother. Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2012. P. 139–156.

Kapitonova N.K., Romanova E.V. Istoriya vneshney politiki Velikobritanii [A History of British Foreign Policy]. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 2016. 840 p

Pravda A., Duncan P. Soviet-British Relations Since the 1970s. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 276 p.

Sovetskaya vneshnyaya politika v gody kholodnoy voyny 1945–1985. Novoye prochteniye [Soviet Foreign Policy during the Cold War 1945–1985. A Reconsideration] / Ed. by L.N. Nezhinskiy. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1995. 508 p.

Trukhanovskiy V.G., Kapitonova N.K. Sovetsko-angliyskiye otnosheniya 1945–1978 [Soviet-British Relations, 1945–1978]. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1979. 303 p.

White B. Britain, Détente and Changing East–West Relations. New York: Routledge, 1992. 224 p.