I.V. Kliun (1873–1943), one of the luminaries of the Russian avantgarde, took several decades to study the theory of color and the possibilities of working with color in practice. He considered color to be a key “element” of painting, which distinguishes it from other forms of art. At the same time, the artist was interested in the ways color interacts with other “elements” of painting — light, shape, texture, etc. The most fruitful result of this work is presumably a group of works that were created by Kliun in the first half of the 1920s on the principle of “light-color” and represented an original version of non-figurative art that stemmed from Suprematism. This part of the artist’s legacy has not yet attracted special attention of researchers. The article traces the prerequisites for Kliun’s transition to work based on the principle of “light-color” and investigates how he pursued and theoretically substantiated the trend of the “dispersal” of color, which appeared among Russian non-figurative artists around 1917, though for various reasons most of them did not support its long-term development. An attempt is made to place the group of works based on the principle of “light-color” into the artistic context of the era and compare it with the works of K.S. Malevich, O.V. Rozanova, A.M. Rodchenko et al. Th e article investigates Kliun’s conceptual substantiation of the principle of “light-color” and its roots in the worldview of the artist infatuated with the idea of a universal rhythm, which determines, as he believed, how the entire Universe develops and becomes apparent in works of art. Kliun programmatically contrasted his compositions, where geometric forms are filled with dynamics and light, lack sharpness and seem to be “dispersed” in space, with the “frozen forms” of Malevich’s Suprematism, with whom he entered into the controversy. Works based on the principle of “light-color” are interpreted as a distinct form of geometric abstraction, created by Kliun to oppose not only Suprematism, but also the industrial art of the early 1920s.

The 1999 elections played an important role in the formation of Russia’s modern party political system. There is an opinion among scholars that two factions of Russian elite clashed in the elections. The first one represented federal power that was puzzled by the plan “Successor”, the other one represented the regional elite, whose members tried to challenge the Kremlin scenario. In line with the logic of party elections, each side formed its own electoral alliances. The pro-Kremlin bloc was represented by the inter-regional movement “Unity”, while the regional governors were represented by the coalition “Fatherland—All Russia”. In a tense contest, the Kremlin party managed to defeat the governors’ alliance, which initially had a much better chance of winning. Analysts explain this victory as being due to the impacts of information wars, the success of the counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya, and the personal popularity of the successor who openly supported the “Unity”. However, all these factors do not fully clarify how an electoral association registered only two months before the elections managed to achieve record results. This article attempts at analyzing the peculiarities of the electoral strategy of the “Kremlin party” during the first stage of the operation “Successor”. The research subject is the mechanism of crisis consolidation which was employed by the presidential power to promote its electoral interests under conditions of political stalemate. The formation of another “party of power” is examined in the context of Russian electoral politics in the late 1990s. This approach led to the conclusion that the key to the “Unity”’s success was the mixed electoral system that the president had fought so hard against after 1993. Fearing party elections, Kremlin spin doctors tried to steer the “Unity”’s election campaign away from purely party agenda towards a single member’s vote in a federal electoral district, where a single candidate with a high personal rating quietly ran for office. Having lost the campaign for abolition of the elections on party lists, the Kremlin managed to partially impose its scenario of “single mandate voting” in the federal constituency .

The present article investigates the major directions and priorities of Republic of Korea’s defense policy during the period of the Fourth–Fifth Republics under the Chun Doo-Hwan rule (1979–1987). An attempt is taken to outline both domestic and international context of defense policy-making in ROK, to reveal the basic instruments of defense policy implementation and to assess the changes brought by Chun Doo-Hwan’s administration. In his military-political course, Chun Doo-Hwan carried forward many of the initiatives of his predecessor Park Chun-Hee. However, he made significant adjustments that were of a more compromise nature. The major outcomes of Chun Doo-Hwan’s defense policy were the significant progress in military-technical development, the transition from isolated projects to mass production of South Korean made military equipment, reduced dependence on the US financial support, the introduction of a more efficient system of defense budgeting and planning, the transformation of relations with the US, the main military ally of ROK, as a result of which Seoul became an equal partner of Washington rather than a client state. Nevertheless, despite the lesser reliance on economic support, South Korea failed to achieve full political independence from the US, since Chun’s regime that came to power through a military coup, needed support of the ally to ensure its legitimation. In this regard, South Korea had to make some concessions to the US, inter alia dismantling its nuclear weapons program launched by the previous administration, temporarily suspending the ballistic missile program and disbanding a large part of the scientific staff involved in missile development, as well as voluntary agreeing to comply with restrictions on the ballistic missile development under the US–ROK 1979 bilateral treaty. The present study is based on such primary sources as ROK Defense White Paper (the major document of South Korean defense policy) and other official documents of ROK and the US.

The purpose of this article is to study the practice of planning and transformation of rural settlement in the Kuibyshev region in the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s. The main attention is paid to the resettlement of “unpromising” rural settlements, which was the basis of the resettlement policy in the studied period. The chronological framework of the study is determined by this circumstance, as well as by the fact that the main regulatory and design basis of this policy in the Kuibyshev region was developed only by the early 1970s, and by the mid-1980s the state refused to divide rural settlements into “promising” and “unpromising”. In addition, it was during these years that the resettlement policy in rural areas was particularly active in the Kuibyshev region in general and in the Stavropol district (which provides the material for this study of the practice of resettlement of “unpromising” rural settlements). The reorganization of the rural settlement network and its rationalization were intended to become a significant factor in both the qualitative improvement of rural living standards and the growth of agricultural production. The regions began to develop schemes of district planning with the classification of rural settlements as “promising” and “unpromising”. Since the early 1990s, the most common view in Russian historical science is that the assignment of tens of thousands of rural settlements to the category of “unpromising” eventually led to intensive migration of the population. At this point the question arises whether such a relationship was characteristic of the entire territory of Russia. This factor was indeed significant for the Non- Black-Soil region, where the state financed the resettlement policy. However, its purposeful implementation was not carried out in all regions of the RSFSR, as evidenced by the situation in the Middle Volga (present-day Samara) region. The results of the study allow us to some extent reconsider the approach to the elimination of “unpromising” villages in our country in the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, which was adopted in historiography.

The article analyses the diplomatic ef orts of Republican Spain, which, under the auspices of the prominent public and political figure Fernando de los Rios (1879-1949), were aimed at obtaining American aid during the Civil War (1936-1939). The author explores every aspect of De los Rios’ activities as the ambassador of Republican Spain in Washington in 1936-1939: efforts aimed at lifting the US embargo on arms sales to Spain; raising the awareness of the US leadership and the American public about the Italian-German intervention; waging active campaign in support of Republican Spain through public lectures, speeches and cultural diplomacy in order to foster solidarity with the cause of the Republic in North American public opinion. As a rule, studying the Spanish Civil War and the position of the United States Russian historians pay more attention to the drafting of American legislation on neutrality. Less attention is paid to the analysis of the policy of Republican Spain towards the United States during this period. The present article is the first in Russian historiography to use documents from the personal archive of Ambassador Fernando de los Ríos, namely, the records of the Spanish Embassy in Washington in 1936-1939 (deposited in Madrid). Some of the results of the diplomacy of Republican Spain in the United States in these years can be assessed as positive, while the others were partially or completely unsuccessful. Fernando de los Ríos’ active campaign in support of the Republic greatly contributed to the shaping of Spain’s image as a victim of fascist aggression and made a certain contribution to the criticism of the policy of neutrality. However, despite all the efforts of the ambassador and the sympathy for the cause of the Republic shared by President Franklin Roosevelt and the American public, the embargo on the arms supplies to Spain remained in force until April 1, 1939, as the United States remained f rmly committed to neutrality.

The phenomenon of “Russian Strikebreaking”, which clearly manifested itself in the second half of the 1920s and 1930s, is an important component of Shanghai’s revolutionary history. Its beginnings date back to the time of 30 May 1925 Movement. After the beginning of the general strike of students, workers and merchants, White Russians found their “niche” in counter-revolutionary activities: they were recruited in the security forces of the International Settlement due to the efforts of former Consul General V.F. Grosse and the Committee for the Protection of the Rights and Interests of Russians. Those, who were mostly part of the “voluntary” army for the protection of the Settlement, were involved in guarding and patrolling. They were also employed in posting propaganda leaflets in the Chinese possessions of Shanghai in a guerrilla manner. The ordinary emigrants, who wanted to get food and a roof over their heads, forgot about solidarity with Chinese workers and took jobs offered by the local authorities in tobacco and shipping companies, China Import & Export Lumber Co., ports, post offices and other socially important enterprises and institutions. The situation at the power plant was a particularly striking example. White Russian workers who were given jobs at the power plant were an effective tool against the strike in the foreign hands. Eventually after the strike ended, Chinese workers were dismissed en masse from the Department of Electricity due to Russian strikebreakers. However, the employment of Russian workers was only a temporary means for the foreigners and the Municipality of International Settlement. Most of the workers who got jobs in private companies, ports and other places were sacked as soon as the strike ended. Russian workers remained in their jobs only at the power plant. The municipal government eventually kept Russians there in order to retain counter-revolutionary forces to fight strikes in the future.

The aim of the article is to study how the theoretical guidelines of the leaders of the Soviet medicine and physical culture movement in 1923– 1926, especially N.A. Semashko, were practiced among young people and how the Komsomol participated in this process. In that period the foundations of the organization of the mass physical culture and sports movement were laid under the guidance of medical workers, and the main emphasis was placed on improvement of the health of the population in general and the health of young people in particular through scientifi c research and medical control. The experience gained in those years formed the basis for the subsequent offi cial policy of promoting physical education and sport among the population. By trial and error, the basic principles of the organization of the physical culture movement in the country were worked out through introducing amateur physical culture circles in enterprises, institutions and schools. The Komsomol was supposed to be involved in order to ensure control over the movement and take a leading role in the clubs. A number of important questions were also raised and resolved during this period, such as the permissibility of competitions and sports in Soviet physical education, the shortage of qualifi ed personnel and relevant equipment. The joint eff orts of the All-Union Council on Physical Culture under the All-Union Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR and the Komsomol bore fruit by the end of the period indicated, when the number of participants in the physical culture movement signifi cantly increased. At this stage Soviet sport was not yet the sport of great achievements and world records, but over time a network of amateur physical education groups covering the whole country was established. It helped to identify talented athletes at a young age and to make physical education and sport a part of the Soviet way of life for everyone.

The process of settlement and economic development of the vast Far Eastern territories began after the annexation of the Amur region to Russia in the second half of the 19th century. Among the colonists were Old Believers from the central and Siberian provinces of the Russian Empire. Additionally, in 1908–1914, Russian Old Believers Lipovans from the Danube countries (Austro-Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria) started to move to the Amur. In the second half of the 19th century, considerable privileges were introduced for peasants who moved to the Amur region. In the beginning of the 20th century, the economic development of the region evolved in accordance with the “Temporary rules for the formation of resettlement plots in the Amur and Primorskaya regions” approved on 22 June 1900. Each male member of a resettlement family, regardless of age, was entitled to 15 desyatinas of land from 1 January 1901. As a rule, in the new areas Old Believers settled in separate communities. Although they had diff erent trades agriculture was their main occupation. Trade was not well developed. Old Believers, who were isolated from major administrative centers and transportation routes, practiced mainly subsistence economy. Contrary to popular belief, the Amur peasants did not ignore using agricultural machinery. Bila Krynytsia Old Believers, who were conservative in the religious and household spheres, skillfully employed the best practices in their economy. The use of agricultural implements was not widespread among the new settlers not because of religious beliefs, but because of a lack of money to buy them. The religious communities of the Far Eastern Old Believers survived until the collectivization of agriculture in the region at the turn of the 1920s. This article examines the economic activity of Old Believers’ peasant communities and their effi ciency, the process of transformation of traditional economic practices under the Soviet power and in the circumstances of the development of the socialist economic model in Platovo and Rozhdestvenska villages. It also examines the passive resistance of Amur Old Believer peasants to collective-farm construction.

The subject of the research in the article is the image and socio-economic practices of a middle-income landowner of one of the provinces of European Russia and his attitude to the role of agriculture in the history of the country and the relationship between peasants and landowners. The article analyzes the civic position of a rationally thinking progressive landowner, his ideological attitudes and motives for streamlining economic activity on the eve of the abolition of serfdom and in the first post-reform decades. The article is based on materials from the family archive of the Smolensk landed gentry Neielovs, inter alia, documents penned by P.D. Neielov, owner of the Peski estate in the Gzhatsky district of the Smolensk province. The author demonstrates that the desire to improve the economic efficiency of estates was stimulated by the economic interests and civic responsibility of the nobleman who linked the prosperity of his estate and the future of Russia with the development of the agricultural sector. The treatment of the peasants by the landowner was rational, as they were both involved in the common economic activity. In the era of serfdom, the latter was based on domination and subordination, which did not rule out economic efficiency. After the abolition of serfdom, it was founded on economic responsibility while some elements of paternalism were retained. The basis for the prosperity of the estate in the feudal era was the rationally organized management of the peasants, combined with the application of the achievements in agriculture. In the post-reform period, the specialization of the economy and civil contracts with peasants came to the fore. From the Russian landowner’s viewpoint, the use of rational farming methods had universal relevance for substantiating his civic position during the times of serfdom and the emancipation of the serfs. The novelty of the research lies in the fact that the author focuses on the life of one person at a crucial time in the history of Russia while studying the problem of the civil responsibility of a noble man. Addressing the case of a landowner of the Smolensk province is based on the author’s conviction that there is great potential in regional and “anthropological” approaches and the genre of microhistory for the study of economic and social practices, as well as the problems of civic consciousness, rationalism and “moral” economy in the feudal and post-reform Russia.

The article examines Ovid’s evaluation of Augustus’ political regime on the basis of the analysis of his interpretation of libertas. The aim of the research is to determine the key meanings of this concept through a detailed examination of the context of its use and to reveal the peculiarities of its semantic relations with the terms “licentia”, “lex”, “ius”, “pudor” and “metus” or “timor”. In the Republic era lex and ius were considered to guarantee political libertas and to prevent it from degenerating into its extreme form, licentia. The latter was understood as one of the signs of a degrading political system and a prerequisite for the establishment of slavery and tyranny, the reign of fear, violence, depravity and injustice. These ideas were refl ected in the poetry of Virgil and Horace who saw Augustus as a protector against such disasters. Unfamiliar with the hardships of civil wars, their younger contemporary Ovid was a bearer of diff erent values, sharply antagonistic to republican morality and many elements of the official ideology of Augustus’ principate. The concept of liberty he had implicitly formulated had a very defi nite political content and oriented the young generation of Romans towards resistance to specific aspects of the system of principate. The study has shown that the term “libertas” in Ovid’s writings is semantically close to the concept of licentia. In most of the cases studied, however, this category has positive connotations and means the possibility of love passion unleashing and the right to express obscene thoughts in private life. As far as freedom is concerned, Ovid demonstrates his dissatisfaction with the strictly republican features of Augustus’ rule. Leges and iura of the principate regime, which embodied the strict moral imperatives of the Republic era, not only did not guarantee freedom, but by provoking shame (pudor) and fear (metus, timor) severely suppressed it. Thus, they prevented achieving the most important value for Ovid — personal happiness (felicitas).