In the art history literature dealing with collectors Mikhail (1870– 1903) and Ivan (1871–1921) Morozov, researchers are primarily interested in the artistic stratum connected with European, mainly French, art. The issues of collecting Russian painting, the choice of certain Russian artists, refl ecting the tastes of collectors, the change of artistic preferences in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, almost never attracted the attention of scholars. This article attempts at determining the approach developed by brothers M.A. and I.A. Morozov in collecting Russian art. In this context, it seems logical to analyze some features of their collections: what names and works the Moscow collectors chose, whether it was conscious and deliberate or spontaneous (as the literature characterized the formation of the Russian part of the Morozovs’ collection). Unfortunately, researchers have not always found arguments in favor of the collectors’ choice of certain Russian masters. At the same time, experts convincingly prove that with regard to works by iconic figures of European art, the choice and purchases were carefully thought out, right down to “booking” in advance a place in the hall for a particular masterpiece. Another question is far from idle: can we talk about the common ground for the Morozovs’ aesthetic views and, accordingly, about a certain continuity in their collections? The analysis of their Russian part allows us to conclude that the collections broadly and voluminously represent the panorama of the main Russian art currents from early Plein Air to Impressionism, from the first World of Art works to Symbolism, from imitations of Cézanne and Gauguin to independent avant-garde experiments of Russian painting in the 1910s. One of the characteristic features of the collection of the younger brother, Ivan Morozov, was fi gurative (object) art, as he was not attracted to objectless painting.

The article examines the problems of religious statistics due to the multifaceted nature of religious identity and flexibility of religious identification and self-identifi cation. This is the cause of frequent diff erences in the estimated data on the number of followers of a particular confession. Population censuses could be a universal and comparable source, but not all countries ask about religious affiliation in the census. And even when there is a question on religion in the census, differences in wording (and differences in the meaning behind the wording) do not always allow for valid comparisons. Therefore, it is more common to find estimates of the number of followers of denominations based on various surveys. Religious identity is very multidimensional, and it often overlaps with other types of identity: ethnic, civil, local. A person can be associated with a certain faith by accepting the dogmatics, or it can be a set of practices and actions that define a way of life or certain milestones of the life cycle or moments/ periods of the religious calendar. Finally, the very feeling of belonging to cultural and historic tradition can bind a person to a particular faith. Therefore, in order to study quantitative indicators of religiosity, it is more convenient to operate with the procedural concepts of identifi cation and self-identifi cation. Religious statistics, or religious demography, was developed in the 1960s, i.e. in the period when the traditional forms of religiosity were being eroded, when religious dynamics in diff erent regions of the world were becoming more and more different, when it seemed that, at least in the West, religion was losing its position. Religious statistics require the adoption of some form of categorization. This article examines whether classifi cation should always be based on denominational principle alone. Religious statistics is a complex and delicate instrument, but nevertheless it draws some contours of religious structure, reveals the peculiarities of the religious situation and allows us to see the trends of its development.

One of the key problems of the state historical policy in the Kaliningrad region during the Soviet period was related to the attitude to the local pre-war historical and cultural heritage, it was partly the memory of the life and activities of the outstanding philosopher and educator Immanuel Kant. The purpose of this article is to identify the prerequisites, factors and stages of integration of Kant’s name and image into the regional culture of memory and commemorative activity. The scientific novelty of the study is determined by the fact that the commemoration of the philosopher is first considered throughout the Soviet period of the region’s history. In the first post-war decade, the key condition for the formation of Kant’s commemoration traditions in the young Soviet region was ensured, that is, his tomb was preserved and taken under state protection in the mid-1950s. It became a place of attraction for Kaliningrad residents and guests of the city. In the 1960s–1970s, the philosopher’s grave was included in excursion routes and tourist guides, respect for his memory was used as an argument in the propaganda system, a tradition of scientific study of Kant’s heritage was formed in the region, and Kaliningrad State University became a center of such research. Under strict restrictions on the study and popularization of pre-war history, Kantian topics were perceived by a part of local intelligentsia as an allowed opportunity to share the “secrets” of the German past of the Kaliningrad land. At the same time, the position of regional authorities was characterized by contradictions, and initiatives to commemorate the philosopher were repeatedly met with resistance instigated by the regional committee of the CPSU. In the years of perestroika Kant’s image was perceived as a “bridge” connecting epochs and cultures. The work on the preparation of restoring the monument to the philosopher began, the plans of the regional branch of the Soviet Culture Fund included a “Kantian” programme of events, Kant became a character in the first popular narratives about the prewar history of the region. The process of integration of the “outstanding ‘fellow countryman’”, “Kaliningrad philosopher” into the regional culture by the end of the Soviet period was considerably accelerated.

The conclusion of the 1963 Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water is an important milestone in the history of the Cold War. It was preceded by long and complex negotiations between the USSR and the US. Measures to impose a moratorium on tests (August 1958 — August 1961) did not yield signifi cant results either in reducing harmful environmental consequences or in reducing the risk of nuclear conflict. In addition, the issue of at least partial test ban was closely linked to the political contradictions between the superpowers, in particular, regarding the status of Berlin. On 9 September 1961, the negotiations were stopped. In the fall, the USSR conducted a large series of explosions, and advances in weapons development required new tests. Moscow’s decision to withdraw from the moratorium was dictated by the desire to demonstrate to its opponents the readiness for any emergency. In 1962, the events around Cuba led not only to intensified testing by both powers, but also to the acute Cuban Missile Crisis in October, when the danger of using nuclear weapons became quite real. The August 1963 treaty was one of the immediate outcomes of the Cuban Missile Crisis. However, it is also important that the superpowers came to the signing of the Moscow Treaty only after their scientific and technological achievements (including, above all, the results of nuclear tests) had been able to ensure a confident strategic deterrence of each other. The tests of nuclear devices conducted by both powers in 1961 and 1962 allowed them to equip all types of carriers with warheads as part of their planned programs to renew strategic nuclear arsenals. At the same time, the Moscow Treaty created a basis for harmonizing the positions of the US and the USSR with regard to nuclear nonproliferation for many years to come.

Perception in international relations has long been studied in political science, but historians have not paid suffi cient attention to it so far. Meanwhile, looking at known events through its prism allows us to draw new conclusions about their origins. The prehistory of World War II and its key episode — the failure of attempts to deter Hitler’s aggression in Europe through the joint eff orts of France and the Soviet Union — can serve as a fruitful field for testing this approach. For the military and political elites of France, the USSR was dangerous due to its unpredictability, but an internally fragile. This presumption leveled all the successes of the Soviet leadership in modernizing the country and the armed forces in the eyes of the French. The increased military danger in Europe after 1933 prompted Paris merely to offer Moscow the role of an ordinary participant in the system of collective security, which was based on the experience of World War I and designed as a new model for the development of international relations and minimization of conflicts between countries. The Soviet government viewed France as a leading imperialist power that prioritized anti-Soviet goals, but had a situational interest in limiting German expansion. At the same time, Moscow believed that Soviet-French cooperation could be effective only as an equal strategic alliance aimed at deterring a potential aggressor. This approach was rejected by French diplomacy, which followed the policy of appeasement. It was a source of a deep crisis in bilateral relations at the time of the 1938 Munich agreements. The collapse of appeasement in early 1939 led to a sharp turn by the French government to strategic planning for a possible war and created a window of opportunity for an agreement with the USSR. However, the inertia of old prejudices deprived the tripartite Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations in the spring and summer of 1939 of their practical content and opened the way for a Soviet-German agreement